一、报告题目：

Optimal Selling Mechanisms with Buyer Price Search

二、主讲人：

Jingfeng Lu（吕景峰）is a professor of economics in National University of Singapore. He is mainly an applied theorist working on auctions, contests and mechanism design. He is also interested in empirics in auctions and contests. His work has appeared in American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Rand Journal of Economics, International Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Public Economics and Economic Theory, among other journals. He is currently an associate editor for Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design.

三、报告时间：

2019年9月12日（周四）15:00-16:30

四、报告地点：

知新楼B423

五、报告摘要：

We study optimal dynamic selling mechanisms when the buyer, who is initially and privately endowed with the value of the object on sale, can conduct costless search for private second-stage outside price. The unique features of this problem include that the second-stage incentive compatibility does not require the usual full monotonicity of the allocation rule, and off-equilibrium-path best strategy cannot be pinned down. We propose a modified Myerson convexification procedure that regularizes the buyer’s virtual value in the dimension of the outside price to identify the revenue-maximizing mechanism in this dynamic setting. At optimum, the seller simply offers a first-stage fixed price, which is only taken by high-value types. In contrast, if the buyer’s second stage outside price is publicly observable, the optimal selling mechanism would take the form of a fixed first-stage price coupled with price matching at the second stage.

六、主办单位：

永利集团88304官网集团