一、报告题目：

Optimal nonlinear pricing by a monopolist with information ambiguity

二、报告人：

王冲，University of Macau

三、报告时间：

2019年6月25日 （周二） 上午 10:00-11:30

四、报告地点：

知新楼B321

五、报告人简介：

王冲，澳门大学经济学博士，研究领域主要集中于产业组织理论以及应用微观经济学。论文发表于International Journal of Industrial Organization, Annals of Economics and Finance等国际知名学术期刊。

六、 报告摘要：

We consider the optimal nonlinear pricing by an ambiguity-averse monopolist. The monopolist's subjective belief about the distribution of buyers is described by epsilon-contamination of an additive probability. We find that under a max-min utility decision rule and with a continuum of buyers, ambiguity aversion leads to bunching at the bottom in the optimal contract, and the distortion at the bottom is reduced. Other high valuation buyers are offered the same quantity as in the case without ambiguity, but they get a greater discount.

七、主办单位：

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